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DRAFT STATEMENT ON THE SECURITY PROGRAM

Document Before the Kilday Committee 6 April 1961

The security program of the Central Intelligence Agency is based on the principle that maintaining the security of the Agency and its operations is the responsibility of every officer and employee. The screening programs of the Agency are so designed as to include consideration of each applicant's ability to support the security program and the rating and selection programs of employees are also designed to include constant awareness by supervisors of their subordinates' security records and habits.

Responsibility for the security screening of applicants and the continuous appraisal of the security suitability of employees is vested in the Director of Security who is responsible for the investigations of applicants, for reinvestigations of employees, for investigations of suspected leaks of information, and for investigation of all violations of security regulations. The Federal Bureau of Investigation is notified of all breaches of security which might be related to, or fall within, the responsibility of the Bureau for the internal security of the United States and is asked to investigate all matters coming within the provisions of Section 8(d) of Executive Order 10450.

It is recognized by the Agency that no single screening technique is, by itself, adequate for purposes of insuring the security suitability of an individual as of a given moment. It is also recognized that no group of screening techniques can insure the continuing security suitability of an individual.

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The Agency has its own investigative force and conducts its investigations only by person-to-person contact by investigative agents with headquarters training or experience and in many cases both. All evaluation of investigative agent reports is conducted in Washington by an experienced appraisal staff which is alert for evidence and for indicators of there being any question as to the applicant's loyalty, integrity, discretion, or trustworthiness and any question as to the applicant's ability to commit himself to, and to support actively the missions and the programs of the Agency. Case appraisals are made by no fewer than two appraisers. Borderline or more derogatory cases are finally adjudicated by the Director of Security or his Deputy. In some borderline cases, the final decision is not made until after liaison and coordination with other screening offices, specifically the Office of Personnel and the Medical Staff. Such cases will have been reviewed and passed on by the Director of Security.

As part of the entrance-on-duty processing, if not as part of the pre-employment screening, each candidate is given a detailed security interview by a security officer trained in the use of the polygraph or lie detector. The results of this interview are immediately verified with the polygraph instrument. Candidates may be rejected or denied employment based on their admissions during this particular interview; in still other cases, the information so obtained requires that the hiring processes be suspended and more extensive investigation conducted.

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Candidates for employment are not permitted to enter their jobs or to undertake classified training without being cleared for Top Secret or being eligible for a Top Secret clearance. Although all regular employees have or are eligible for a Top Secret clearance, there are special, more sensitive types of information to which their basic Top Secret clearance does not entitle them. A rigid compartmentalization system exists as does a series of provisions for rechecks with and reappraisal by the Office of Security for special clearances for access to information of special sensitivity.

All incoming employees are indoctrinated in security and sound security practices and a reorientation program exists for those already on duty. These programs include stress on the responsibilities of all employees for the continuing security of the Agency, including bringing to the attention of their supervisors evidences of poor security practices and of a possible security risk existing on the part of others.

The security file or record on each employee is subject to review at any time and is actually reviewed before major changes in assignments, including any change in post and before special clearances are granted and a program exists for review at least every five years if there has been no review for other purposes. A program of constant liaison and coordination exists between the Office of Security and other screening elements of the Agency; a coordinated decision is mandatory, for example, before an employee is permitted to travel overseas.

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